Messy wrote: ↑
Mon Jul 03, 2017 8:23 pm
Other than the lack of an action plan, this is not a bad FRA
The layout is broadly PAS79, so don't blame the assessor for it's useless layout!!
I hate it with a vengeance as it is not logical and fails to layout the information in a user friendly, accessible (for members of the public) fashion. However, it does usually involve an action plan. Just because we haven't seen it, does not mean there isn't one. So lets be careful with alleging he (the assessor) has made an error.
OK, he is chancing it saying the fire brigade can't ask for it after all lets not forget Article 27 of the Fire Safety Order:
Powers of inspectors
27.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this article, an inspector may do anything necessary for the purpose of carrying out this Order and any regulations made under it into effect and in particular, so far as may be necessary for that purpose, shall have power to do at any reasonable time the following—
(a)to enter any premises which he has reason to believe it is necessary for him to enter for the purpose mentioned above and to inspect the whole or part of the premises and anything in them, where such entry and inspection may be effected without the use of force;
(b)to make such inquiry as may be necessary for any of the following purposes—
(i)to ascertain, as regards any premises, whether the provisions of this Order or any regulations made under it apply or have been complied with; and
(ii)to identify the responsible person in relation to the premises;
(c)to require the production of, or where the information is recorded in computerised form, the furnishing of extracts from, any records (including plans)—
(i)which are required to be kept by virtue of any provision of this Order or regulations made under it; or
(ii)which it is necessary for him to see for the purposes of an examination or inspection under this article,and to inspect and take copies of, or of any entry in, the records;
(d)to require any person having responsibilities in relation to any premises (whether or not the responsible person) to give him such facilities and assistance with respect to any matters or things to which the responsibilities of that person extend as are necessary for the purpose of enabling the inspector to exercise any of the powers conferred on him by this article;
I really do not want to be critical of this report. I don't think its that bad and covers areas that I wouldn't necessarily point out.
The problems around Grenfell are complex and many. Competence is most definitely a part, but I would not question Mr Stokes's competence from this FRA as it would most probably been seen as suitable and sufficient if subject to a LFB audit.
Designers, CDM roles, testing organisations, architects, the landlords, builders and others may well have a more important role in what happened leading to this disaster compared with the guy who carried out the fire risk assessment.
The media (including the hapless Mail on Sunday) need to keep calm & slow down. There are several investigations in progress, so let's all take a chill pill. I for one am more interested in the truth than I am in scapegoating one person - but there again, I don't have to sell newspapers so what do I know?
Thanks for that analysis, Messy. Having had a read through it now, I'm of the same view itself.
The Action Plan may well exist but mightn't have been sent to the residents, perhaps it came as two attachments and only the FRA was released. It wouldn't be the first time.
The problem with the coverage of the FRA now is that the public have absolutely no idea about the scope of the FRA. This document, which the media also has in full, is being manipulated by the use of a few choice examples of poor language or findings that the TMO wasn't doing it's required visual inspections of fire evacuation routes and firefighting equipment.
Remember the scope was only related to the common areas and not the structure as a whole, which would have been dealt with in a later assessment in 2016 and as noted by Mr. Stokes, that would be something which would have to be addressed in CDM, at design stage and through materials and testing.
While it's dangerous to draw conclusions, there is also reference in 2012 to the lack of fire doors on apartments. These were subsequently installed (30 minute duration) by the TMO but it makes the situation in Camden all the more damning, in my opinion. Without too much hyperbole, a "stay put" policy in such circumstances is more like a "stay and die" policy as vital safe evacuation time is lost as we saw in Grenfell if you stay in place in a situation where rescue is not able to reach you despite the crews best efforts.