Hello
Does anyone know of any good cases, where a designer has been prosecuted, for not considering the maintenance of a building / structure etc.
Would appreciate if you could give any guidance.
Cheers
Designing for maintenance or not
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Hey CN,
I had a quick look through the HSE database and didn't see many relating to building design, most I saw were all relating to machinery etc.
http://www.hse-databases.co.uk/prosecut ... &x=27&y=17
However, there was this one here which may or may not be a design flaw "Ramp entrance not attached with chains and failed at 10th floor " (chains not attached because they were not designed in, or just because they were not there?)......
http://www.hse-databases.co.uk/prosecut ... F150000469
I hope this helps even a wee bit
I had a quick look through the HSE database and didn't see many relating to building design, most I saw were all relating to machinery etc.
http://www.hse-databases.co.uk/prosecut ... &x=27&y=17
However, there was this one here which may or may not be a design flaw "Ramp entrance not attached with chains and failed at 10th floor " (chains not attached because they were not designed in, or just because they were not there?)......
http://www.hse-databases.co.uk/prosecut ... F150000469
I hope this helps even a wee bit
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I have just had this discussion with one of my Project managers/Designers and he had not designed anything for maintenance, he did after i pointed out the fact that people have to work in these environments well after the job is finished.
As a Planning Supervisor i am very stringent on Designer Risks, some don`t like it, but i think it is about time they started thinking.
Woodie
As a Planning Supervisor i am very stringent on Designer Risks, some don`t like it, but i think it is about time they started thinking.
Woodie
Steel Erectors dies - Designer charged with Failure to Include Adequate Information about temporary stabilisation of Steelwork
A steel erector died after falling about 11 metres whilst helping remove a temporary brace from structural steelwork on a new factory. As the temporary brace was removed 3 trusses buckled causing other trusses to fall out of alignment and partial collapse of the structure. The steel erector, who was sitting on a truss, without fall arrest harness, was thrown to the ground and died.
The structural steel was designed, fabricated and supplied by an engineering contractor whose design engineer and erection manager together developed an erection sequence and safety method statement for the construction phase. The actual steel erection was sub-contracted out.
Approximately one week before steel erection was due to start on site, it was known by all involved parties, that roof purlin delivery would be delayed. It was recognised that temporary bracing would be required if erection was to continue without significant delay. To this end two tubular braces were devised by the design engineer, to replace the stabilising effect of the missing purlins. The braces were to be fitted at the apexes of the trusses .
The design engineer at the engineering company did not consult his colleague, the erection manager, to agree the form of temporary bracing. The tubular braces proved difficult to fit on site due to tolerance problems, and were proved inadequate and not a practical solution. The structural steel sub-contract foreman used purlins from another area of the structure to compensate for the lack of bracing members and, when there was a problem installing other adjacent purlins, the foreman, not realising the structural consequences, removed the tubular bracing to ease the fixing of these purlins.
Neither the erection sequence nor the method statement were updated to take the late purlin delivery into consideration. As a result the erection foreman formed his own flawed method of work. The original method statement should have been amended to take account of the safety precautions required for fitting temporary bracing and to ensure stability of the structure. Additional information should also have been added to the design to highlight the precautions required when the temporary stabilising braces were removed, as the sequence of removal was critical.
The engineering contractor was prosecuted under Regulation 13 (2) of The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 for failing to ensure that the steelwork design included adequate health and safety information on the temporary stabilisation of the structure and Regulation 9(1) of the Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996 for failing to take all practicable steps to ensure that the structure being built did not collapse accidentally putting persons at risk. The contractor was fined £4000 for each of the two charges.
----------------------------
Lack of erection information
A Plymouth firm of engineers appeared in Court in February charged with failing to include adequate safety information in the design of the £12 million National Marine Aquarium. The HSE prosecution followed investigations after the collapse of 26 tons of concrete slabs through the aquarium's roof in June 1997 when two workers cheated death. The unfinished roof collapsed and left them hanging by harnesses. Apparently the men had been securing concrete slabs to supporting beams when they gave way.
HSE said "This had the potential to be a particularly horrendous incident and it is an absolute miracle that there were no fatalities". The engineers are alleged to have failed to include permanent bracing in the design to ensure that the beams were capable of the carrying the loads imposed during construction and of failing to include adequate information on the method of laying the concrete roof planks.
But, perhaps the escapes weren't a miracle after all - someone did a risk assessment and decided that harnesses should be used. An example of taking steps to reduce the possible impact of a "low probability - high impact" event? Perhaps the "commentator" in the next item could learn a thing or two from this!
------------------
The Ramsgate Walkway Collapse is a good one to look at to,
I cant remember the source of these but i think the APS keep a online record and certainly you can use as search terms for names etc
A steel erector died after falling about 11 metres whilst helping remove a temporary brace from structural steelwork on a new factory. As the temporary brace was removed 3 trusses buckled causing other trusses to fall out of alignment and partial collapse of the structure. The steel erector, who was sitting on a truss, without fall arrest harness, was thrown to the ground and died.
The structural steel was designed, fabricated and supplied by an engineering contractor whose design engineer and erection manager together developed an erection sequence and safety method statement for the construction phase. The actual steel erection was sub-contracted out.
Approximately one week before steel erection was due to start on site, it was known by all involved parties, that roof purlin delivery would be delayed. It was recognised that temporary bracing would be required if erection was to continue without significant delay. To this end two tubular braces were devised by the design engineer, to replace the stabilising effect of the missing purlins. The braces were to be fitted at the apexes of the trusses .
The design engineer at the engineering company did not consult his colleague, the erection manager, to agree the form of temporary bracing. The tubular braces proved difficult to fit on site due to tolerance problems, and were proved inadequate and not a practical solution. The structural steel sub-contract foreman used purlins from another area of the structure to compensate for the lack of bracing members and, when there was a problem installing other adjacent purlins, the foreman, not realising the structural consequences, removed the tubular bracing to ease the fixing of these purlins.
Neither the erection sequence nor the method statement were updated to take the late purlin delivery into consideration. As a result the erection foreman formed his own flawed method of work. The original method statement should have been amended to take account of the safety precautions required for fitting temporary bracing and to ensure stability of the structure. Additional information should also have been added to the design to highlight the precautions required when the temporary stabilising braces were removed, as the sequence of removal was critical.
The engineering contractor was prosecuted under Regulation 13 (2) of The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 for failing to ensure that the steelwork design included adequate health and safety information on the temporary stabilisation of the structure and Regulation 9(1) of the Construction (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1996 for failing to take all practicable steps to ensure that the structure being built did not collapse accidentally putting persons at risk. The contractor was fined £4000 for each of the two charges.
----------------------------
Lack of erection information
A Plymouth firm of engineers appeared in Court in February charged with failing to include adequate safety information in the design of the £12 million National Marine Aquarium. The HSE prosecution followed investigations after the collapse of 26 tons of concrete slabs through the aquarium's roof in June 1997 when two workers cheated death. The unfinished roof collapsed and left them hanging by harnesses. Apparently the men had been securing concrete slabs to supporting beams when they gave way.
HSE said "This had the potential to be a particularly horrendous incident and it is an absolute miracle that there were no fatalities". The engineers are alleged to have failed to include permanent bracing in the design to ensure that the beams were capable of the carrying the loads imposed during construction and of failing to include adequate information on the method of laying the concrete roof planks.
But, perhaps the escapes weren't a miracle after all - someone did a risk assessment and decided that harnesses should be used. An example of taking steps to reduce the possible impact of a "low probability - high impact" event? Perhaps the "commentator" in the next item could learn a thing or two from this!
------------------
The Ramsgate Walkway Collapse is a good one to look at to,
I cant remember the source of these but i think the APS keep a online record and certainly you can use as search terms for names etc